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Sammendrag 
Sammenhengen mellom inntekt, den direkte kostnaden ved å oppdra barn og fruktbarhet har 
betydning for både politikkutforming og samfunnsfaglige teorier om fruktbarhetatferd. Vi 
bruker eksogen variasjon i inntekt (lønn og barnetrygd), og den direkte kostnaden ved å 
oppdra barn (endringer i barnetrygd) for å estimere kausale effekter på fruktbarhetsutfall. 
Variasjone kommer fra en regional reform som reduserte skattenivået og økte barnetrygden i 
Nord-Troms. Endringene ble ikke implementert i Sør-Troms, og denne regionen kan dermed 
brukes som kontrollgruppe i et kvasieperiment.   
 
Vi estimerer forskjell-i-forskjellmodeller (difference-in-difference), der vi kontrollerer for 
observerbare kjennetegn som er felles for Troms og varierer over tid (tidsfasteffekter), og 
uobserverbare kjennetegn som varierer mellom kommuner men er konstante over tid 
(kommunefasteffekter). Vi finner at en reduksjon i den direkte kostnaden ved å ha barn økte 
fruktbarheten blant kvinner tidlig i 20årene. Paritetsspesifikke modeller viser at det 
hovedsakelig er sannsynligheten for å få et første barn som blir påvirket. Effekten er 
konsentrert blant ugifte kvinner, en gruppe som består av både samboere og enslige. Funnet er 
robust til modellering av regionale trender i fruktbarhet. Det er også en antydning til at 
sannsynligheten for å få et tredje barn øker på grunn av reformene, men dette funnet er ikke 
robust på tvers av spesifikasjoner.   
 
Lavere skatt vil kunne øke arbeidstilbudet, og slik påvirke fruktbarhet indirekte. Empiriske 
undersøkelser tyder på at funnene våre ikke er drevet av endringer i arbeidstilbudet.  
 
1 Introduction
Western high-fertility countries typically have a “package” of policies that facilitate child-
bearing, each often quite costly. For voters, politicians and policy makers who face both
low fertility and increasingly severe budget constraints, an exact measure of the pro-
natalist effects of each policy is crucial. In this study, we assess how changes in income
and the direct costs of a child affects fertility the Nordic context, taking Norway as an
empirical example.
According to the microeconomic theory of fertility, a reduction in the cost of a child
should lead to an increase in fertility (Becker 1960). Kindergartens, which reduce the
indirect or time cost of children, contribute to the relativly high fertility in Norway
(Rindfuss et al. 2010). However, effects of the direct or pecuniary cost of childrearing on
fertility in the Nordic countries has been explored less. Furthermore, couples or women
are expected to respond to an increase in household income either by investing more in
each child (Becker and Lewis 1974) or by having more children (Becker 1960). As decisions
of work and fertility are jointly determined (see e.g. Francesconi (2002)), estimating such
income effects from observational data is challenging. For causal estimation, exogenous
changes in household income – through increase in cash allowances or tax breaks – is
required.
A handful of previous studies have used individual-level data to identify effects of
changes in universal child benefits on fertility.1 Milligan (2005) utilizes a regional increase
(and subsequent revocation) of cash transfers to parents in Quebec, using the rest of
Canada as a control group in a difference-in-difference design. Cohen et al. (2013) uses
parity-specific changes in the level of child benefits in Israel to identify income and price
effects on fertility. Both these studies mainly utilize variation in the benefit levels for the
third child, and are hence unable to give information on the income and cost effects for
lower parities. Furthermore, as relatively young women rarely are on the margin to have
1There is also a relatively large literature on extensions and revocations of welfare benefits for the
low-income population in the US. Studies with a plausibly causal design tend to find no or very modest
income and price effects in this population (see e.g. Dyer and Fairlie (2004); Kearney (2004); Fairlie and
London (1997); Joyce et al. (2004); Wallace (2009))
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a third child, these studies are unable to give an accurate description of how responses
to changes in income and the cost of children varies with age.
In this study, we utilize a regional reform implemented in parts of Northern Norway
in 1989-1990 to estimate price and income effects on fertility. When fully implemented,
the reform increased the universal child allowance by about 3600 NOK yearly, about 575
1990-USD.2 As the additional allowance was provided also for children already born, this
reform induces an income effect among mothers, as well as a reduction in the direct cost
of a child at all parities. Furthermore, regional tax breaks implied an exogenous increase
in household income in the reform region, providing an additional opportunity to test for
income effects on fertility.
We identify effects by comparing women who resided in Northern Troms (reform re-
gion) to women who resided in bordering municipalities in Southern Troms (non-reform
region). Our analysis is based on detailed, high quality data on fertility, education, in-
come and marital status for the full female population in this region, drawn from various
administrative registers. To avoid bias from selective migration, place of residence and
all potentially endogenous covariates are measured prior to the reform.
Taking the number of children as the main dependent variable, we estimate reform
effects both in a standard difference-in-difference setup, and by parametric modeling of
region- and age-specific trends in fertility. In both these specifications, we find that the
reform increased fertility among unmarried women in their early 20s. This finding is
robust to a battery of robustness checks. We also find some evidence of effects on higher
parities, although this is somewhat less robust. The strongest effects are found for the
transition to parenthood. In contrast to mothers, there is no pure “income effect” in this
group – the income of childless women increase only if they have a first child. Hence, the
pattern in effects by parity indicates that the effects mainly are due to a reduction in the
direct cost of a child.
Our results indicate that the direct cost of childbearing is among the drivers of fer-
tility postponement in Norway. Relatively small reductions in the direct cost of a child
2Using an exchange rate of 6.25 NOK per USD. All conversion rates are obtained from
http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Statistics/exchange rates/currency/USD/.
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could be expected to translate into a lower mean age at birth. As the increase is concen-
trated among unmarried mothers, it seems likely that a reduction in the price of a child
would lead to a larger proportion of non-union childbearing and/or a larger proportion
of children born in more fragile unions.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline a theoretical
framework, discuss relevant studies, and state expectations of effects. Section 3 describes
the relevant reform details. Section 4 presents the identification strategy and the data
used in the analysis. The main results are presented in Section 5, robustness checks in
Section 6. A concluding discussion is given in Section 7.
2 Theoretical and empirical framework
According to the microeconomic theory of fertility, the demand for children will increase
if the cost of raising a child falls.4 The direct cost of a child – which is the concern
of this paper – consists of expenses to clothes, food, equipment and housing, as well as
schooling and health care. Governments can reduce the direct cost of raising a child by
cash transfers, tax breaks and housing subsidies, and by providing high-quality public
health care and schooling (Gauthier 2007). The indirect cost of childrearing equals the
earnings loss due to childrearing – including immediate loss due to fewer hours worked,
and long-term effects of human capital depreciation (Walker 1995).
The simplest microeconomic model of fertility predicted a positive income effect on
fertility, i.e. that family size increases in household income, all else equal (Becker 1960).
This was later refined to an assumption that the spending on children increases in income,
but that parents respond to income increases mainly by investing more in each child
(Becker and Lewis 1974).5 Despite the simplicity of the theoretical model of income and
fertility, it has proven hard to test empirically. Mainly, higher earnings also makes it
3On average, cohabiters consistently have higher dissolution rates that married couples, even when
comparing couples with children (Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010)
4In this framework, it is assumed that the demand for children translates directly into actual fertility,
i.e. that there are no regulation costs (c.f. Easterlin and Crimmins (1985)). For our purpose, this
assumption is a reasonable heuristic, as the reform is unlikely to change the regulation costs of fertility.
5In other words, “child quality” is assumed to be a close substitute for “child quantity”.
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more costly to take time off to care for a child, making for a negative substitution effect
of (women’s) wages on fertility.6 This counteracting mechanisms complicates identifying
a (potentially) positive income effect.
Variation in money transfers to parents – in the form of cash or tax breaks – provides
excellent opportunities to investigate fertility effects of changes in income and the direct
cost of children, as there are no complications arising from substitution. Earlier studies
based mainly on time series data find weak or no effects (for studies on cash transfers see
Ermisch (1988); Walker (1995); Zhang et al. (1994); Gauthier and Hatzius (1997); Kalwij
(2010), for an overview of the effects on welfare see Moffitt et al. (1998)). Similarly,
while Whittington et al. (1990) finds large fertility responses to tax breaks for parents
analyzing time series data, Crump et al. (2011) find substantially smaller and less robust
effect using the same data set. However, studies based on time series data are prone to
omitted variable bias from correlated trends in benefits levels and fertility that differ by
country or region.
Our study contributes to a small but growing body of individual-level studies using
exogenous variation in income and the price of children to test predictions from the mi-
croeconomic theory of fertility. The most obviously comparable study is Milligan’s (2005)
comparison of fertility development in Quebec with the fertility development in the rest
of Canada. Those findings suggest a quite large effect of benefits on fertility, particularly
at second and third parities. Despite the regional variation in child benefits, some serious
challenges to identification are apparent. First, the increased cash allowance was intro-
duced partly as a response to a regional fertility decline, making the reform introduction
potentially endogenous to the outcome (Besley and Case 2000). Furthermore, Milligan
(2005) finds some empirical evidence of regional trends in fertility, but has insufficient
data to model these. Due to data limitations, these estimates are also vulnerable to
upwards bias from selective in-migration of women with higher latent fertility.
Cohen et al. (2013) utilize parity-specific differences and variation in the level of Israeli
child benefits over time, finding that while a reduction of the price of the marginal child
6Earnings may also be correlated by unobservable personal characteristics that can affect the propen-
sity for childbearing.
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has a substantial effect on fertility, the magnitude of the income effect is negligible.
The study utilizes (arguably) unexpected increases and revocations of child benefits,
which also vary by parity, to estimate effects on fertility. Despite a sound identification
strategy, it leaves several questions to be explored. First, Israel has strong pro-natalist
sentiments, and estimates may not generalize to less pro-natalist cultures. As the benefits
were targeted at increasing fertility, reform effects could be mediated through changes
in norms and values regarding childbearing (Jagannathan et al. 2010), making them less
informative of the fertility effects of changes in income and costs of children.7 Finally, as
Cohen et al. (2013) mainly utilizes variation in the benefits for the third child, meaningful
comparisons of effects across parities are unattainable.
Reductions in the direct cost of children and income increases could affect both whether
and when women have children. Having children shifts some resources from own consump-
tion to spending on children, which is expectedly preferable at higher ages when earnings
are higher (see e.g. Happel et al. (1984)).8 Hence, both reductions in the direct cost of
children and income increases should, all else equal, be more important at lower ages.
Effects mainly at lower ages, and/or at lower parities, indicate that the reform mainly
induces a tempo shift.9
While previous study has found that the timing of children is more sensitive to policy
changes than completed fertility (Gauthier 2007), there are also compelling reasons that
the reform could affect family size. Most importantly, the cash transfers reduce the cost of
having a(nother) child relative to the price of all other goods – i.e. both own consumption
and child quality. While the income increase induced by the reform could be invested in
either child quality or increases in family size, the relatively lower price of the marginal
child should also shift this spending towards an additional child. Effects at higher ages –
where the potential for postponement or recuperation is small – are indicative of quantum
7Jagannathan et al. (2010) finds that reducing in welfare benefits to large families affects fertility
through normative pressure rather than economic incentives (see also Gauthier (2007)).
8This holds if one cannot borrow freely against the future, and the marginal utility of consumption
is diminishing.
9This interpretation relies on the assumption that women have a target family size, so that the reform-
induced increase in fertility at lower ages will lead to a relative decline in fertility among the treated
women at higher ages. Our experimental setup does not allow us to compare the completed fertility of
treated and untreated women.
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effects. In the treated birth cohorts, almost half of the women who become mothers have
two children, while about a third go on to have three or more children.10 Hence, effects
at the propensity to have three or more children are indicative of quantum effects.
2.1 Disentangling mechanisms: Subpopulation analysis
Estimating effects in separate subpopulations allows for a better understanding of the
mechanisms linking the direct costs of a child to the demand for fertility. First, reform
effects could vary by marital status. In our sample, we are able to distinguish between
married women and unmarried (i.e. cohabiting, single and divorced) women. As living
with a partner before having a child has a practical advantage and is to some extent
normatively expected (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001), women who are married
can respond more quickly to changes in the economic incentives of childbearing. On the
other hand, married women on average have better-earnings partners and hence higher
household income also compared to cohabiters (Texmon 1999; Petersen et al. 2011).
Hence, if the relative size of the income increase and price reduction is most important
for the reform effects, we expect to see the largest effects among unmarried women.
Both previous research and theory points to the expectation that effects will be con-
centrated among women with lower educational attainment. On average, women with
higher education have higher earnings (and, for married women, higher earning spouses).
Hence, the indirect cost of childbearing will be larger among highly educated women,
while higher household income is expected to make the demand for children less sensitive
to changes in the direct cost of children.11
With respect to (earned) income, predictions are more involved. At first glance,
as lower earnings strongly proxies lower household income (also through earnings ho-
mogamy) one would expect the strongest effects among low-earning women. Somewhat
anti-intuitively, previous studies have found strongest effects of cash transfers among
high-income households (Milligan 2005; Cohen et al. 2013). Cohen et al. (2013) argue
10Source: Statistics Norway StatBank https://www.ssb.no/en/statistikkbanken, Table 05769
Number of children distributed by age and cohorts of births (per cent).
11Assuming diminishing marginal utility of consumption, see Happel et al. (1984).
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that this could result from non-linearities in the quality-quantity interactions. 12
Unlike Milligan (2005), we use a measure of women’s earnings that is exogenous to
the reform. However, particularly when looking at the propensity to have a first child,
earnings level does not capture economic resources only. Relatively high earnings may
signalize that one has gained a foothold in the labor market, which may correlate with
being at a life course stage where one is at the margin to have a first child (Bergnehr
(2008), Hart (2015), Pedersen (2014)). Women who are at the margin of having a (first)
child may be more readily influenced by relatively small changes in income or the direct
cost of a child.
3 Reform details
Our sources of exogenous variation is two regional reforms, implemented in 1989-90, that
substantially improved the economic conditions of families and individuals in Northern
Troms and Finnmark. Importantly, the reforms were not a response to a regional fertility
decline. They were targeted at recruiting and retaining high-skilled labor to the region
and to improving the labor market for low-skilled workers.13 As such, this reform is
not a “family policy” aiming at increasing fertility. This has two important advantages.
First, regional reforms that in part are a response to fertility decline (such as the reform
studied by Milligan (2005)) indicate that regional trends in fertility may differ in the first
place, raising concern on whether the identifying assumptions required in a difference-
in-difference design holds. Second, Jagannathan et al. (2010) show that changes in cash
incentives motivated by changing fertility behavior may affect fertility mainly through
changes in norms and values. Hence, compared to reforms that are targeted at increas-
ing (or reducing) fertility (such as Cohen et al. (2013)), the effects of this reform are
considerably more likely to be mediated by changes in economic circumstances only.
This section give a detailed picture of how the increased child benefits (Section 3.1)
12Households with income around the median will invest additional income in the children they already
have. At some point, the marginal utility of further increases in child quality are very small, and
households with very high incomes may respond to an income increase by increasing family size.
13Norway has a long tradition - with considerable political and public opinion support - of “district
policies” aimed at maintaining population levels in remote parts of the country.
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and the tax deductions (Section 3.2) changed the economic conditions of women in the
control region. In Section 3.3, we discuss other changes that could have affected fertility
differently in the reform and control region, and how we handle these.
3.1 The child benefit reform
Table 2 shows the benefit level by year over time in the reform and control regions.
Starting 1 January 1989, universal child care benefits were increased with 2400 NOK
yearly in the reform region, an increase amounting to roughly $ 347 (in 1989 dollars,
6.9 USD/NOK).14 In 1990, additional benefits in the reform region increased to NOK
3600 or $ 575. Due to inflation, the real value of the benefits declined slightly during the
1990s despite a small nominal increase in 1991. Neither the general child benefits (for the
whole country), nor the additional benefits introduced for Finnmark and North Troms
are means-tested.
Anticipatory effects are very unlikely. In August 1988, Prime Minister Gro Harlem
Brundtland announced the intention to increase the cash allowance in Finnmark and
North Troms, and to generally strengthen the “district policies” targeted at Northern
Norway. The final decision was made by the Norwegian Parliament 20th December 1988.
The child benefits was paid from January 1st the next year. The consequences of this
reform were easy to grasp, potentially making for stronger and more immediate effects
(Gauthier 2007).
An estimate of the direct costs of childrearing in the child’s first year of living for
Norway in 1989 is given in the first column of Table 1. The estimate accounts for the
cost of clothes, food, health care, toys and equipment during the first year of living. 15
The estimated cost of a child is then compared to the cash allowance for a first child in
the reform region (column 4) and in the rest of Norway (column 6).16 As the table shows,
14Conversion rates obtained from http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Statistics/
exchange rates/currency/USD/.
15Health expenses for mother and child are low, as they are mainly covered through the public health
care system.
16While the additional benefit per child in the reform region is independent of family size, the additional
“base” cash allowance (given in both the reform and treatment region) is slightly higher for higher parities.
For simplicity, the first child is displayed here.
11
Table 1: The cash allowance and the monetary cost of a first child.
Cost of childa Size of child benefitb
Treatment region Control region Difference
NOK NOK % NOK % NOK %
1989 19 320 10 236 53% 7 836 41 % 2 400 12%
1990 21 112 12 348 58% 8 848 41% 3 600 17%
a Estimates of cost of living from March 1989 made by the National Institute of Consumer Research
(http://www.sifo.no/files/standardbudsjett1989mar.pdf). The sum includes expenses to food,
clothes, health, toys, and various equipment. Increases in various household expenses, amounting to
approximately 100 NOK per month (depending on household size), are not included. The budget does
not account for increases in housing cost driven by an additional child. SIFO budgets for 1990 are not
available, the 1989 estimate is adjusted upwards for a 4,1% price increase to give the 1990 estimates
(https://www.ssb.no/en/kp).
b Source: NOU 1996:p. 134 and 436.
Table 2: Income increase induced by the regional increase in cash allowance by year and
number of children.
Year Childless 1 child 2 children 3 children 4 children 5 children
1989 0 2400 4800 7200 9600 12000
1990 0 3600 7200 10800 14400 18000
1991-1997 0 3792 7584 11376 15168 18960
Note: Source Norwegian Ministry of Regions & Municipalities (2004, p. 134 and 436). Not adjusted for
price increase.
even absent the regional reform, the Norwegian child allowance reduced the immediate
direct cost of a child with 41%. When the reform was fully implemented, women in the
reform region received a cash allowance that should cover 58% of the expenses in the
child’s first year of life. The reduction in the price of a child is 17 percentage points
larger in the reform region than in the rest of the country.17 If the demand for children
is sensitive to the direct cost of a child, we expect positive effects in our sample.
As the cash allowance was given also for children already born, it also implied a
substantial income increase for women with (many) children. Table 2 shows the increase
in household income induced by the reform, by parity and year. The child cash allowance
increases linearly in number of children. In relative terms, the income increase is likely
to be even larger for women with several children, as these on average will have lower
17As the costs of raising a child increases with the child’s age, the proportion covered by the child
allowance will decrease over time (http://www.sifo.no/files/standardbudsjett1989mar.pdf). How-
ever, as earnings also increase with the parent’s age, the direct costs of childrearing in the near future
may still be crucial for fertility decisions.
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Age group Mean earnings [95% C.I] Allowance as prop.
15-19 16184 [14968,17400] 0.17
20-24 63831 [61035,66626] 0.04
25-29 77506 [73303,81709] 0.03
30-34 81926 [77582,86271] 0.02
35-39 85797 [81621,89972] 0.02
Total 58736 [57133,60340] 0.07
Table 3: Mean earnings among women in the reform region prior to the reform (1988).
Separate estimates by age group.
earnings. For a mother with two children, the additional child allowance for the two
children already born and the marginal (potential next) child would cover about 75% of
the cost of the marginal child.
The size of the cash allowance is economically meaningful also compared to mean
earnings among women in the reform region. For women in their 20s and 30s in the
reform region, the additional cash allowance amounted to about 2-4 per cent of the
yearly earnings (Table 3). Among adult women, the value of the cash allowance relative
to earnings is highest for women in their early 20s (who have the lowest earnings), and
lowest for women in their 30s. For teenagers, who rarely have employment as their main
activity, the increase in cash allowance is equal to more than a fifth of yearly income.
The increased cash transfer can increase fertility through both income and price effects:
It reduces the price of the marginal (potential next) child, as the direct costs of this child
will be partly offset by the increase in child allowances. Additionally, for families with
children, the reform increases household income, making for a possible positive income
effect on the propensity to have another child.
3.2 Tax deductions
From 1 January 1990, substantial regional (income) tax deductions for all taxpayers were
implemented in the reform region, increasing net wages in Nord-Troms and Finnmark.18
Tax deductions were adjusted promptly by the tax authorities, giving obvious and imme-
18Prior to 1990, individual taxpayers in the region had enjoyed a slightly higher general tax deduction
than taxpayers in the rest of the country, but the 1990 increased those tax breaks/deductions con-
siderably. See http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/krd/Subjects/rural-and-regional-policy/
virkeomrader-retningslinjer-og-regler/action-zone-in-finnmark-and-nord-troms.html?id=527171
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diate effects on paychecks for salaried employees. Additionally, (private sector) employers
in the region were exempt from (mandatory) employer contributions to the national social
security system, reducing the cost of labor for employers, potentially increasing demand
for labor. Through higher wages and lower unemployment, the economic situation in the
reform region was to be improved.
The income tax breaks consisted of two parts, an increase in the general (lump-sum)
deduction available for all taxpayers and lower (marginal) tax rates for incomes at higher
levels. The general deduction was increased by 10 000 NOK per individual, and twice this
amount for single parents.19 The deduction was later increased to 15 000 NOK, again with
twice the amount available for single parents.20 As the tax deduction is given to single
parents independent of their number of children, it may affect fertility of single employed
women through two separate mechanisms. For childless single women, the additional tax
deduction implies a reduction of the direct cost of the first child. For single mothers, the
tax deduction increases household income, potentially giving a positive income effect on
fertility.
Furthermore, two changes in the tax rate were implemented: The “base tax”, applying
to taxable income at all levels, was set 3.5 percentage points below the rate for the rest
of Norway. Additionally, the increase in tax for higher tax brackets (“toppskatt” or
surtax) was reduced with 4 percentage points in the reform region, compared to the
rest of Norway.21 While both the “base tax” and the surtax fluctuated over time, the
difference between the tax levels in the reform and control regions remained relatively
stable (Angell et al. 2012, p.140).
The reform could influence female labor supply through two channels. First, if the
reform increases fertility, it will expectedly also reduce female labor supply (Angrist
and Evans 1996; Cools and Strøm 2014). This does not threaten the validity of our
results. More worrisome, the tax reform could increase female labor supply directly. If
19Ministry of Finance: Ot.prp.no 32, 1989-1990.
20Norwegian Ministry of Regions & Municipalities (2004, p.9). The deduction was 10 000/15 000 NOK
in Tax Class I, and 20 000/30 000 NOK in Tax Class II. Single parents (“enslige forsørgere”) are classified
as Tax Class II.
21This applies to Innslagspunkt I, i.e. the lowest of the top tax brackets (Norwegian Ministry of
Regions & Municipalities 2004, p. 9)
14
the reform causes a shift hours from unpaid to paid work, this indicates a strengthened
substitution effect. In presence such an effect, estimates of price and income effects will be
biased towards zero, and hard to interpret. We test for effects on women’s labor supply
by estimating difference-in-difference models taking earnings and the propensity to be
employed (have taxable earnings) as the dependent variables in Section 6.4. Reassuringly,
there is no clear indication that the reforms have increased female labor supply through
channels other than increased fertility.
3.3 Other relevant regional changes
In addition to the reforms mentioned above, starting in 1988, individuals had their (pub-
lic) student loans reduced by 10% (up to a limit of NOK 15.000) for each year residing
and working in Northern Troms and Finnmark. This policy also aimed to retain and
recruit highly educated individuals to the region. Hence, confounding effects from this
change are likely handled by measuring place of residence prior to the reform. We check
whether selective migration took place in Section 6.3. When the (long term) cost of ed-
ucation is reduced, some women may be induced to pursue higher education, which will
again likely lead to a postponement of childbearing (Lappeg˚ard and Rønsen 2005). We
test for the presence of such an “enrollment effect” by estimating the effect of the reform
on educational enrollment, using same difference-in-difference approach (Section 6.4).22
4 Methods and Data
4.1 Identification strategy
Our starting point for identification of reform effects is a standard difference-in-difference-
model, which pertains to a Linear Probability Model (LPM) including fixed effects (i.e.
a set of dummy variables) for region and year. The fixed effects net out change over time
22Strictly speaking, the reduced student loan repayments increases disposable income both in the short
and long run. However, the increase in household income in the short run is likely too small to affect
fertility decisions. While the increase in life time disposable income are of a larger magnitude, and could
affect fertility if individuals are perfectly rational and forward-looking, we expect that consequences in
the far future that are relatively hard to grasp to be less important for fertility decisions.
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that is shared across regions, and any region specific factors that affects fertility but are
constant over time. The main DD-specification takes the following form:
Yi,t =α + βRefi,tXRefi,t + βAgei,tXAgei,t + βAgeSqi,t(XAgei,t ×XAgei,t)+
m∑
m=1
βMunii,tXMunii,t +
1997∑
y=1984
βY eari,tXY eari,t + ε
(1)
XRef is a dummy which takes 1 for years in the reform period for individuals who
lived in the reform region in the year prior to the reform. βRef captures the effect of
the reform on the outcome Y, given that the identifying assumption holds. XY ear are
dummies for year (year fixed effects), XMuni are dummies for municipality (municipality
fixed effects). We include a linear and quadratic term for age. As reform effects are
estimated separately by 5-year age group, this is equivalent to a quadratic spline with
five year knots.
If the trends in fertility across the region are similar (absent the reform), Equation
1 will identify the reform effects. Figure 2a indicates that when the fertility of all age
groups is considered jointly, the similar trend assumption holds. However, when fertility
trends are broken down by age group (Figure 3), some tendency of regional trends appear.
To rule out that such regional trends are driving the results, we also estimate a Regional
Trend Specification. For these models, the identifying assumption is that trends are
modeled correctly, and hence netted out fully. As shown in Figure 3, the trends in age
specific fertility are non-linear. A curvilinear time trend (dotted lines) fits the trends well,
and this specification is included in the models. The time trend is estimated separately
by region and 5-year age group. When the model is estimated separately by 5-year age
group, this gives the following specification:23
23An alternative to the curvilinear trends would be a cubic spline model. As shown in Supplementary
Material, Figure S.1, such a specification is immensely flexible, following the trends in fertility in the
reform and control regions very closely. Hence, one risks netting out region specific changes in fertility
that happened after the reform only – i.e. the reform effects the DD-model is intended to capture. To
avoid controlling out the very variation we aim to capture, we prefer the quadratic trend model.
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Yi,t =α + βRefi,tXRefi,t + βAgei,tXAgei,t + βAgeSqi,t(XAgei,t ×XAgei,t)+
m∑
m=1
βMunii,tXMunii,t + βLnReform(XY ear ×XRefReg) + βLnControl(XY ear)+
βSqReform(XY ear ×XY ear ×XRefReg) + βSqControl(XY ear ×XY ear) + ε
(2)
Where XRefReg is an indicator for living in the reform region, XY ear is a numeric vari-
able for calendar year. βLnReform and βSqReform are the estimated linear and quadratic
trends for the reform region, and βLnControl and βSqControl are the estimated linear and
quadratic trends for the control region. Standard errors are robust with clustering on
municipality, in line with recommendation for analysis of the type we perform here (An-
grist and Pischke 2009). Municipality of residence is measured yearly, but no later than
in the year before reform implementation to avoid endogeneity issues.
4.2 Data and study sample
Our data comes from various register sources with information on the full population of
Norway. The data from different registers are merged using a unique person identifier
(PIN). Data from the population registers include information on date of birth (for both
mothers and children) as well as municipality of residence as January 1st each year.
Information on educational enrollment and completion was obtained from the National
Educational Database (NUDB).
Due to a tax reform implemented in 1983 that affected the treatment and reform
region differently, our observation window starts in 1984. Our observation window is
limited upwards by the introduction of the cash-for-care reform in 1998, which could
change the economic incentives of childbearing and confound the effects of our reform
(Andersen et al. 2015). Our data set is restricted to women who lived in the treatment-
or control region for at least one year in the time period 1984-1988.24 Based on this
24This restriction is due to the requirement that place of residence is to be measured prior to the
reform. Up to 1988, women can exit and (re)enter the sample by moving. For the years after the reform,
the sample is fixed based on residence in 1988.
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Figure 1: Map of Troms with municipality borders.
Treatment municipalities in dark grey, control municipalities in light grey, cities omitted from the
control region in white.
sample, we construct a data set of person years. Person years for women younger than
15 or older than 39 are dropped. The latter restriction is due to the comparatively low
fecundability of women above age 39, which may hinder them in responding to fertility
incentives, and bias our estimates towards null.
For reform and control groups to be comparable, we utilize the fact that the reform
was implemented in the northern, but not the southern, part of Troms. The seven reform
municipalities in Northern Troms hence constitute our reform or treatment region.25
Our control region are municipalities in Southern Troms. The treatment region has no
larger cites, while the cites Tromsø and Harstad are located in Southern Troms. As
fertility trends are found to vary on a rural/urban axis (Kulu et al. 2007), we exclude
the municipalities Tromsø and Harstad from our sample.26 We still refer to the control
region as Southern Troms for brevity.
25These are Kvernangen, Skjervøy, Nordreisa, K˚afjord, Lyngen, Storfjord and Balsfjord.
26When Tromsø and Harstad are included in the control region, trends are no longer similar in the
treatment and control region (results available upon request).
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4.3 Variables
Dependent variables
Our main dependent variable is number of children, derived from monthly updated data
on children ever born. For each year, we include children already born, as well as con-
ceptions that year leading to live births. Dates of conception are imputed as the birth
date minus the average length of pregnancy. Based on the number of children, we also
construct three dummy variables for parity specific analysis, for having at least 1, 2 and
3 children in the given year.
We also estimate the difference-in-difference models taking educational enrollment and
earnings as dependent variables (see below for specifications).
Reform variables
Our independent variable of interest is a dummy for “Reform” - indicating that the
individual lived in the reform region in the reform period. As the reform may induce
selective migration, we use place of residence in 1988 as a proxy for current place of
residence in the reform (post 1988) period. This gives Intention To Treat (ITT) estimates.
This exogenous measure of region of residence is also used in the construction of the trend
variables and for clustering. To investigate whether the endogeneity of place of residence
does affect the results, we also estimate a model where place of residence is genuinely
time varying for all years.
Controls
All models include municipality fixed effects (i.e. dummies for municipality of residence)
and either year fixed effects, or a (set of) trend variables, as outlined above. Age is
captured by a linear and a quadratic term.
A quasi-experimental modeling strategy often does not, strictly speaking, require the
inclusion of further (individual) characteristics for identification of reform effects (Angrist
and Pischke 2009). However, inclusion of covariates may serve as a useful robustness
check, and also reduce unexplained variance and hence sharpen the precision of our
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Table 4: Balancing tests on observable characteristics.
Control region Reform region
Mean [CI] Mean [CI]
Number of children 1.157 [1.150,1.165] 1.140 [1.129,1.150]
Age 27.008 [26.966,27.051] 26.465 [26.408,26.522]
Prop. married 0.339 [0.337,0.342] 0.310 [0.306,0.313]
Earned income 76 220 [75 797,76 643] 71 352 [70.816,71 888]
Prop. enrolled in education 0.176 [0.174,0.178] 0.186 [0.183,0.189]
Prop. with higher education 0.310 [0.308,0.313] 0.283 [0.279,0.287]
Prop. with basic education only 0.050 [0.049,0.051] 0.073 [0.071,0.075]
Number of women aged 15-39 in municipality 15306 [15244,15368] 10505 [10474,10537]
Note: Sample is women aged 15-39 who lived in the Treatment or Control region in Troms in the
period 1984-1997.
estimates. As all covariates observed in our data set (except age) can themselves be
affected by the reform, they must be measured prior to the reform (i.e. in 1988 at the
latest). We therefore allow covariates to vary with time, up to 1988, from which their
value is held fixed. To avoid excessive lags after the reform, the models with covariates
are estimated on data up to 1991 only. We also utilize the set of exogenous covariates to
estimate separate models by subsample.
We include the following covariates. First, a set of dummies for educational attain-
ment, distinguishing between mandatory (primary and lower secondary), high school and
higher education. Missing education is included as a separate category. We also include
a dummy variable for being enrolled in education, set to 1 if the individual is registered
as enrolled in education for at least 4 months the current year. As a proxy for union
status, we include a dummy variable for being registered as married in the current year.27
Finally, household income is proxied by earned income in thousand NOKs.
20
5 Main results
5.1 Descriptive results
Regional trends in fertility and related outcomes
Balancing tests of the comparability of the reform and treatment region are shown in
Table 4. The table shows the means and confidence intervals of number of children,
earned income, and municipality size, as well as the proportion married, with higher
education, with lower eduction, and enrolled in education – all estimated separately
for the reform and control regions. All outcomes are measured in 1987. There are no
significant differences in number of children by region of residence. There are small,
but statistically significant differences in age, earned income, educational enrollment and
attainment, and municipality size. However, as long as the trends in these outcomes
are similar in the reform and control region, they will be netted out in a difference-in-
difference design.
Figure 2 provides a test of whether the regional trend assumption holds, looking at
number of children, proportion married, earnings and educational enrollment and attain-
ment. The figure shows the means of these outcomes, estimated separately for the reform
region (Northern Troms, black) and the control region (Southern Troms, grey).28 The
trends are strikingly similar across regions, with two possible exceptions: The propor-
tion with higher education seems to increase somewhat faster in the treatment than the
control region after the reform, most likely indicating selective migration (Figure 2d).
Earned income seems to be increasing at a slightly faster pace in the control region than
in the reform region, also before the reform (Figure 2e).
Figure 3 shows the fertility trends estimates separately for five-year age groups, as
an additional test of the regional trend assumption. The figure gives some evidence of
regional age-specific trends, casting some doubt on the identifying assumption required
27While an indicator of cohabiting unions would certainly be of interest, this is not available for the
full study sample in the years of interest.
28As the mean is averaged over the ages 15-39, the mean number of children is significantly lower than
completed fertility for the cohorts included.
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(a) Number of children. (b) Prop. married
(c) Prop. enrolled in education (d) Prop. with higher educaction
(e) Earnings
Figure 2: Trends in number of children, proportion married, education and earnings by
region.
Note: Calculations are simple means, without correction for age structure. Sample is women aged 15-39
who lived in the Treatment (black) or Control (grey) region in Troms county at some time point in the
period 1984-1997. Information on region of residence is updated yearly throughout the period, and hence
potentially endogenous in the post-reform period.
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Figure 3: Trends in number of children by age group and region.
Note: The full lines show simple means, while the dotted lines are predictions from OLS regression of
number of children on age and age squared for the given subsample. Sample is women aged 15-39 who
lived in the Treatment (black) or Control (grey) region in Troms county at some time point in the period
1984-1997. Information on region of residence is updated yearly.
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in Eq. 1. However, with the exception of women aged 30-34, these trends are captured
well by a quadratic trend (the dotted lines in Figure 3). While the trend model nets
out bias from regional trends efficiently, the trends are estimated also using post-reform
variation in the outcome. Hence, these run the risk of netting out some of the variation
in the outcome generated by the reform. Aware of the limitations of each specification,
we present our main results both in a standard difference-in-difference specification (Eq.
1) and a regional trend specification (Eq. 2).
The descriptive statistics indicate that the reform did facilitate family formation: After
the reform, it seems that fertility falls slower, and increases faster, in the reform than in
the control region (Figure 2a). Furthermore, the proportion married seems to increase
faster in the reform than the control region after the reform (Figure 2b). However, these
aggregate estimates are based on actual region of residence, and therefore prone to bias
from selective migration. Also, region-specific changes in the age structure could drive
trend deviations. Hence, multivariate estimations are required to test whether a reform
effect is present.
5.2 Main regression results
This section presents the main results, as estimated by LPM. As fertility responses and
regional trends likely vary considerably by age, all multivariate results are estimated
separately by age group. Women in the main childbearing years will more often be on
the margin to have a(nother) child, and may thus be more likely to respond to economic
incentives. On the other hand, women in their 20s have significantly lower earnings (Table
3) and may hence be more responsive to economic incentives.
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Table 5 shows the main results estimates separately by age group, using year FE (odd-
numbered columns) and regional trends (even-numbered columns). We find significant
and substantial reform effects among women aged 20-24, across specifications. For women
in this age group, the reform causes a 10 percentage point increase in the (yearly) proba-
bility of conceiving a child, as estimated in the standard DD-specification. In the (more
conservative) regional trend specification, the reform effect is halved, but still statistically
significant. There is also a tendency of effects among women in their early 30s, but this
effect is not robust across specifications, and should be interpreted with some caution.
For teenagers (aged 15-19) the reform effect is quite precisely estimated to zero across
specifications. Hence, in this context, it seems that teenage fertility is not sensitive to
economic incentives. Teenage fertility is very low in our sample (see e.g Figure 3), and
it seems likely that there is simply no latent demand for children among teenagers that
makes them respond to economic incentives. In this age group, one would, if anything,
expect a fertility response to be mediated by lower abortion rates. Aggregate data on
the percentage of births ending in abortion by county gives no indication that the reform
affected the overall propensity to terminate pregnancies (Supplementary Material, Figure
S.2).
Parity specific effects
As outlined in Section 2, the mechanisms driving the reform effects depend on parity.
Among childless women, the reform work only by reducing the direct cost of the first child.
For mothers, there is an additional income effect from the increase in cash allowance from
children already born. To explore parity-specific effects, we also estimate effects of the
reform on the probability of having (conceived) at least 1, 2 or 3 children (Table 5). We
also estimate models for higher parity transitions, but these models yield no significant
results (available upon request).
The parity-specific models show that the strongest and most robust effects for the
transition to parenthood, concentrated among women in their early 20s (Table 5, column
3 and 4). In this group, the propensity to enter parenthood increases by 5-7 percentage
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points (depending on specification) due to the reform. In the DD-specification, we also
find effect on the propensity to have a second child among women in their early 20s, but
this effect is netted out when the regional trends are included. The effects among women
aged 30-34 (column 7 and 8) are found at the propensity to have at least two and at least
three children, but are significant in the Regional Trend model only.
Effects are strongest for the propensity to enter parenthood, which is the only parity
for which there is no income effect due to the cash benefits (Table 2). This indicates
that our results are driven by reduction in direct costs of children (present at all parities)
rather than income effect.29 Importantly, while parents could also choose to spend the
additional income on “child quality”, no such close substitutes for having children are
available for childless women.
The effects on the propensity to have a third child among women in their early 30s
may very well be a quantum effect, indicating that the reform shifted some women from
a completed family size of two children to a completed family size of three. However, as
these results are sensitive to specification, we are cautious in our conclusions.
5.3 Subgroup analysis
To investigate which mechanisms that are likely to drive our results, we also estimate
effects for different subpopulations. For reasons outlined in Section 4.3, we restrict the
time series to the period 1984-1991. Models are again estimated by age, and we present
results both using a standard DD-model and a Regional Trend model.
Effects by marital status
As most women prefer to have and raise a child together with a partner (Hobcraft and
Kiernan 1995; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001), women who are living alone will
expectedly respond slower to changes in income or the cost of children. On the other
hand, the cash transfer implies a relatively larger change in economic circumstances for
29Importantly, the income effect present for mothers only is due to cash transfers, which are given
irrespective of hours worked. Hence, downward bias from substitution cannot explain the parity-specific
findings.
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(a) Unmarried women. (b) Married women.
Figure 4: Reform effects on number of children by marital status and age.
Note: Sample is women who lived in the Treatment or Control region in Troms county at some time point
in the period 1984-1988, and who were in the age range 20-39 at some point in the period 1984-1991.
Information on region of residence and marital status is updated yearly up to 1988, after which region of
residence in 1988 is used as an (exogenous) proxy. Estimates from Linear Probability models. All models
include controls for municipality fixed effects, age, and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level.
women who are living alone or cohabiting (see Section 2.1), and may hence generate larger
responses in this group. Furthermore, as outlined in Section 3.2, single parents have an
additional lump-sum tax deduction, which further reduces the cost of having a first child
outside a union, and induces an additional income increase for single mothers. Hence, the
design of the reform points toward finding the strongest effects among unmarried women.
Figure 4 shows the reform effects estimated separately for unmarried (4a) and married
(4b) women. For married women, the effects are close to zero. Hence, in accordance
with expectations, the reform effects previously found are concentrated solely among
unmarried women. Parity specific models (not shown) indicate that the effects among
unmarried women are concentrated at the transition to parenthood.
While the cash incentives clearly increases non-marital childbearing, it is not obvious
that this means an increase in non-union childbearing. At the time of the reform, as much
as 70 per cent of the non-marital births in the reform region were to women who were
cohabiting with the child’s father at the time of the birth (Appendix Figure A.1). While
register data on cohabitation were unavailable in Norway at the time of the reform, we
explore whether the reform affects the propensity to form and formalize unions in Section
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6.4.
Effects by socioeconomic resources
We have also estimated effects separately by socioeconomic resources, that is, highest
completed educational attainment and earnings quintile, both measured before the re-
form. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no clear pattern of effects by socioeconomic status.
For educational attainment (Supplementary Material, Table S.1), most significant ef-
fects are found among women with medium education, but this is also by far the largest
educational group, making for a substantially better test strength.
Results estimated separately by earnings quartile are also shown in Table S.1. Again,
no clear pattern by earnings level emerges. As sample size becomes small, precision de-
creases, and the estimates are rarely significant. For the highest quartile (Q4), significant
effects are found in both directions indicating that the identifying assumption does not
hold in this specification and subsample.
6 Robustness checks
This section presents results from a variety of robustness checks, each performed to inves-
tigate whether our identifying assumptions hold, and the results presented above have a
causal interpretation. We present two traditional robustness checks – inclusion of exoge-
nous covariates and a placebo test. We also investigate how the results change if place
of residence was measured yearly also after the reform. Finally, we explore whether the
reform affected earnings and educational enrollment, which would make for a theoreti-
cally less clean interpretation of the reform effects. In sum, these tests indicate that our
identifying assumption holds, and that we are unlikely to capture fertility effects driven
by changes in women’s labor supply or educational enrollment.
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(a) Year and municipality FE. (b) Regional trend model.
Figure 5: Robustness check: Controls for sociodemographic characteristics.
Note: Estimates from Linear Probability models. All models include controls for municipality fixed
effects, age, and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Sample is women
who lived in the Treatment or Control region in Troms at some point in the time span 1984-1988, and
who were in the age range 20-39 at some point in the period 1984-1991. All covariates are updated yearly
up to 1988. After 1988, information from 1988 is used as an exogenous proxy for all covariates except
age.
6.1 Controls for sociodemographic characteristics
If our design captures a true natural experiment, inclusion of (exogenous) covariates will
not alter the estimates. As a robustness check, we therefore present a model that control
for educational enrollment and attainment, earned income, and marital status.30 The
covariates are time varying, but not updated after 1988 to avoid endogeneity issues . For
these lagged covariates to have a reasonable interpretation also in the post-reform period,
we restrict the observation period to 1984-1991. The estimates in Figure 5 compares
the main model estimated on this shorter panel (“Limited controls”) and the estimates
after inclusion of the exogenous controls outlined above (“Full controls”). The model is
estimated both in the traditional DD-specification (Eq. 1) and in the Regional Trend
specification (Eq. 2). All models take number of children conceived as the dependent
variable, and are estimated separately by age group for comparability with the main
results above.
In general, the models with limited controls replicate the results from the full period
30While we cannot be certain that inclusion of further characteristics, unobservable to us, would yield
similar results, the inclusion of observed covariates is the only feasible test.
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(Table 5) fairly closely. For women aged 20-24, the reform effect is significant at 10 percent
level in the DD-specification, and like in the main model, is approximately halved in the
Regional Trend Specification (the loss of significance in this specification is unsurprising
due to the loss of power). In general, the addition of control attenuates the estimates
somewhat, but not dramatically, towards zero. The change is smallest in the Regional
Trend specification, indicating that this model provide the soundest identification.
6.2 Placebo reforms
If the identifying assumption holds, estimating “reform effects” in years before the reform
will not yield significant results. To test this, we estimate effects of a “placebo reform”
in 1985. The setup for the placebo effect is identical to the one used for main results. We
measure place of residence in the year prior to the reform, and create a “reform variable”
which is the interaction between living in the reform region the year prior to the reform
and the year being 1985 or later. To avoid using any variation in fertility generated by the
reform, we exclude all post-treatment years (1988 onwards). The placebo reform (Table
5, lower panel) is estimated in the same specifications as the main model (Table 5, upper
panel).
Reassuringly, the effects of the placebo are close to zero, and rarely significant. While
we only show effects for number of children and the propensity to have at least one child,
no effects are found at higher parity transitions. For all age groups except for women in
their early 30s, the zero effects are quite precisely estimated across specifications. For
women in their early 30s, there are some significant negative effects in the regional trend
model, indicating that the trend model is unable to net out regional trends properly in
this age group. This falls in line with the strongly non-linear fertility trends in this age
groups (Figure 3), indicating that the validity of the effects in this age group is somewhat
compromised in the Regional Trend model.
In sum, the Regional Trend model performs better in the robustness checks than the
standard DD-specification in all age groups but 30-34.
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6.3 Migration to and from the reform region
The regional reform package we study had the explicit aim of slowing migration from
the region and motivating (high-skilled) persons to (re-)settle there. Furthermore, as the
reform lowered the cost of a child, it could motivate women who intend to have a child in
the near future to move into the region – or to not move from the region. To investigate
whether the reform did invoke selective migration with respect to fertility, we compare
our main results using an exogenous reform covariate (Table 5, upper panel) with results
based on time-varying residence status (Table 5, middle panel).
When allowing for post-reform migration, the estimates in the Year FE model are
somewhat attenuated, and no significant effects emerge in the Regional Trends model.
This gives some indication that reform induced migration biases the estimates toward
zero, i.e. that the reforms induced in-migration of women who did not intend to have a
child in the near future. This falls well in line with the intent to recruit/retain highly
educated people, an interpretation corroborated by the increased proportion of highly
educated women in the region (Figure 2d).
The fact that this reform did induce selective migration underlines the need of using
an exogenous measure for treatment. Particularly, regional reforms targeted at changing
fertility (such as the one analyzed by Milligan (2005)) may very well induce in-migration
of individuals with above-average latent fertility.
6.4 Effects on other outcomes
Earned income and educational enrollment
As outlined in Section 3, a potential complication with our design is that the reform
affected not only the economic circumstances of families, but also the incentives to work
and enroll in education. Increased educational enrollment or increased female labor sup-
ply might in itself reduce fertility, biasing the effect of economic circumstances on fertility
towards zero. As an indirect test for such bias, we estimate reform effects on earned in-
come and educational enrollment. For these outcomes, age-specific trends in the outcome
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(a) Earnings in 1000 NOK. (b) Prop. with earnings. (c) Prop. enrolled in educ.
Figure 6: Reform effects on earnings and educational enrollment.
Estimates from Linear Probability models. All models include controls for municipality fixed effects,
age, and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. When earnings is the
dependent variable (Figure 6a and 6b), the sample is women who lived in the Treatment or Control
region in Troms at some point in the time span 1984-1988, and who were in the age range 20-39 at some
point in the period 1984-1997. For educational enrollment as the dependent variable (Figure 6c), women
who lived in the Treatment or Control region in Troms at some point in the time span 1984-1987, and
who were in the age range 20-39 at some point in the period 1984-1997, constitute the sample.
are similar across region prior to the reform (Supplementary Material, Figures S.3 and
S.4b), justifying the estimation of a standard DD-equation (Eq. 1). For educational
enrollment, the reform is defined as happening in 1988 (and, accordingly, municipality of
residence is measured no later than 1987), but otherwise the design is identical.
We estimate effects for two outcomes capturing female labor supply: The probability
of having earned income in a given year, and yearly earnings in 1000 NOK.31 Two mech-
anisms could drive reform effects on earned income. First, if the reform increases fertility,
this is likely to translate into somewhat lower labor supply, concentrated at the same ages
at the fertility response. Second, the tax deductions could increase labor supply directly,
leading to positive effects across age.
Our results, displayed in Figure 6, show no effects on the probability of working (i.e.
the extensive margin), and significant negative effects on total earnings. In combination,
this indicates a reduction in hours worked among those employed (the intensive margin)
due to the reform. The negative effects are found at ages where there are positive effects
on fertility. Hence, both the direction of the effects, and the distribution of effects by
age, indicate that these effects are mediated by changes in fertility.32 This interpretation
31Year fixed effects makes adjustment for price increase superfluous.
32In theory, negative effects could also be an income effect on labor supply due to the tax reform: As
the tax reform increases hourly wages, some women may choose spend some of this additional income to
“buy time” – i.e. work less. If this mechanisms was driving the results, we would expect negative effects
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is further strengthened by the observation that the proportion stay-at-home-mothers was
relatively low, while the proportion mothers working part-time was substantial at time of
the study (Norwegian Ministry of Children & Families 1996, Ch. 3). Hence, a reduction
in earnings at the intensive margin is a plausible response to increases in family size. Our
results give no indication that reform effects are biased downwards as women substitute
time towards market work due to tax deductions.
There is no indication that the reform increased educational enrollment among women
(Figure 6c). While the reduction in student loans did reduce the life time cost of educa-
tion, this change did not seem to have influenced the choices of the women in Troms. One
potential explanation for this lack of effect is the student loan reduction mainly improved
economic circumstances years into the future, and that implications of this change was
non-obvious (Gauthier 2007).
Effects on proportion married
As shown in Figure 4, the reform effects were concentrated among women who were
unmarried at the time of the reform. This raises the question of whether the reform
increases non-marital (and possibly also non-union) childbearing, or whether it ups the
pace for forming or formalizing a union. In this section, we explore reform effects on the
proportion married.
Appendix Figure A.2 shows the estimated reform effects on the propensity to be mar-
ried, in both the fixed effects and regional trend specification. Due to some evidence of
region-specific trends in the proportion married (Supplementary Material, Figure S.4a),
the latter is more robust. In our preferred specification, the reform does not affect the
proportion married. Hence, while the reform shifts some women into parenthood, this is
not paralleled by an increase in the proportion women living in a formalized union.
across all ages.
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7 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we have utilized a regional reform to estimate the effect of economic cir-
cumstances on fertility behavior. The regional design makes for plausible identification
of causal effects, as we can compare people who lived in the same county at the same
time, but where exposed to different economic policies. The treatment and control re-
gions consist of municipalities comparable on observable characteristics, and display very
similar trends in fertility prior to the reform.
It seems clear that the reform induced some women to have a first (and perhaps second)
child earlier than they would otherwise have chosen to. A reduction in the mean age at
birth has a lasting impact on population structure (Goldstein et al. 2003). Our results
also indicate that the reform increased the third birth probability among women in their
early 30s, and reduces the labor supply slightly in the same group. This indicates that
lowering the direct cost of a child could increase completed family size in Norway. While
this result is unsurprising, we are not aware that any other study with a plausible causal
design has identified this effect in the Nordic context.
We find no indication that the additional income effect among mothers – induced by
the increase in cash allowance for children already born – translates into stronger effects
at higher parities. This points toward that the reduction in the cost of a child, which
applies to all parities, drives our results.
The subpopulation analysis (Section 5.3) reveals that the effects are concentrated
among unmarried women. The reduction in the cost of children was largest in this group,
in part because women in the treatment group who had a first child without living with
a partner received a substantial additional tax break on top of the increased child cash
allowance and income tax reductions (Section 3.2). Our results indicate that reductions
in the cost of a child seem to change the order of life course transitions, shifting some
births from higher ages and formalized unions to lower ages, where unions are less likely
to be formalized, or even formed. To the extent that stability of parental unions have
benefits for adults and children, a shift of births from more stable to less stable union
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contexts will have less favorable consequences.33
Among the women shifted into early parenthood due to the cash transfers, we find
little indication of reductions in labor supply (Figure 6). Hence, our results do not raise
concerns that increases in cash transfers to mothers will weaken young mothers’ com-
mitment to the “dual strategy” of work and motherhood (Ellingsæter and Rønsen 1996).
For women in their 30s who are induced by the reform to have a third child, a different
pattern emerges: here, our results indicate that some women prefer the combination of a
larger family and shorter work hours when the direct cost of raising a child is lowered.
The combination of a clean quasi-experimental design and access to population data
of high quality corroborates the robustness of our results, giving our study credibility
when compared to previous similar setups. As our reform is not targeted at increasing
fertility, effects mediated through mechanisms other than changes in costs or income
are very unlikely. The combination of a regional reform and extremely detailed data
allows us to construct an a priori plausible control group, and for extensive (indirect)
testing of the identifying assumption. When these extremely detailed tests give any
reason for concern, we are able to net out age-specific regional trends in fertility by
parametric modeling. The plausibility of our identifying assumption is also bolstered by
the estimates being relatively unchanged when exogenous covariates are included, and by
a placebo test yielding zero effects. Furthermore, the availability of exogenous covariates
allows us to estimate effects in subsamples without endogenous conditioning, which was
neither feasible for Milligan (2005) nor Cohen et al. (2013).
However, some concerns with our analysis should be mentioned. First, while the theo-
retical expectations of how the tax benefits and cash allowances interact can be outlined,
studying each of these in isolation would make for a theoretically cleaner interpretation
of the results. As it is, we are able to test that the reform did not affect women’s labor
supply through other channels than increasing fertility (i.e., that the substitution effect
does not bias our estimates downwards). However, due to the combination of effects,
33Though the majority of the non-union births are to cohabiting women (Appendix Figure A.1b),
these unions are significantly less stable than marital unions: Using data from Norway in the reform
period, Kravdal (1997) shows that many Norwegian cohabiting women are “[w]anting a child without a
firm commitment to the partner” (see also Vinberg et al. (2015)).
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we abstain from calculating price- and income elasticities, which again complicates com-
parison of reform effects across contexts. Furthermore, as our main effects are identified
among unmarried women, it would be of both theoretical interest and policy relevance
to investigate whether the effects are concentrated among non-union births, or births to
cohabiting women. Unfortunately, limitations of register data on cohabitation do not
permit such investigations.34
As for all quasi-experimental studies, the external validity of estimates remains a
concern. Our external validity is strengthened by the finding of similar effects on third
births in both Canada (Milligan 2005) and Israel (Cohen et al. 2013). If anything, our
context should facilitate relatively weak effects of reductions of the direct costs of a child.
With publicly covered high-quality schooling (through university) and nearly free public
high-quality health care, as well as relatively low housing prices, the direct cost of a
child in Troms in around 1990 was relatively low compared to most other regions in
today’s Western world. Hence, our results indicate that the demand for children would
be sensitive to the direct cost of childrearing in almost any Western context today.
Our findings contribute to the understanding of how fertility behavior is influenced
by income and the direct cost of children. While previous studies have demonstrated
convincingly that the low indirect costs of childbearing matters for the high fertility in
the Nordic countries (Rindfuss et al. 2010), knowledge of the importance of the direct
cost of childbearing and household income been more scarce. Using quasi-experimental
data, we show that fertility in Norway increases when the direct cost of a child falls. This
indicates that the low direct cost of raising a child contributes to the high fertility in the
Nordic countries.
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Appendix
(a) All births by union type. Troms and
Norway.
(b) Non-marital births by union type.
Troms and Norway.
Figure A.1: Births by union type and region
Source (both panels): Data from Medical Birth Register, accessed online at
http://statistikkbank.fhi.no/mfr/. F4b, Live births by mothers’ union status. Own calcu-
lations in left panel.
The rapid increase in the proportion births to cohabiting women 1984-87 is mainly due to a correction
of underreporting of births cohabiters in this period.
Figure A.2: Reform effects on the propensity to be married.
Note: Estimates from Linear Probability models. All models include controls for municipality fixed
effects, age, and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Sample is women
who lived in the Treatment or Control region in Troms at some point in the time span 1984-1988, and
who were in the age range 15-39 at some point in the period 1984-1997.
Supplementary Material
Figure S.1: Trends in number of children by age group and region. Cubic fit.
Note: The full lines show simple means, while the dotted lines are predictions from OLS regression of
number of children on age, age squared and age cubed for the given subsample. Sample is women aged
15-39 who lived in the Treatment (black) or Control (grey) region in Troms county at some time point
in the period 1984-1997. Information on region of residence is updated yearly.
Figure S.2: Induced abortion as percentage of live births. By region and year.
Source: The Medical Birth and Abortion Register, accessed online at
http://statistikkbank.fhi.no/mfr/. Induced abortions as percentage of all births by region
(“fylke”).
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(a) Earnings in 1000 NOK. Missing earnings are set to 0.
(b) Proportion with earned income.
Figure S.3: Trends in earnings by age group and region.
Note: The full lines show simple means, while the dotted lines are predictions from OLS regression of
number of children on age and age squared for the given subsample. Women aged 15-39 who lived in the
Treatment (black) or Control (grey) region in Troms county at some time point in the period 1984-1997
are included in the sample. Information on region of residence is updated yearly.
(a) Prop. married
(b) Prop. enrolled in higher education.
Figure S.4: Trends in proportion married (upper panel) and proportion with higher
education (lower panel) by age group and region. Dotted lines show a quadratic trend
predicted from OLS regression.
Note: The full lines show simple means, while the dotted lines are predictions from OLS regression of
number of children on age and age squared for the given subsample. Sample is women aged 15-39 who
lived in the Treatment (black) or Control (grey) region in Troms county at some time point in the period
1984-1997. Information on region of residence is updated yearly.
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